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ABSTRACT
In the following I would like to expose Julian Culp’s normative 
argumentation to some empirical considerations. My commentary 
focuses on one of the central premises of the book: Culp assumes 
that education can make a decisive contribution to solving the 
current challenges in plural and globalized societies. He states that 
recent political philosophy has unacceptably neglected the issue 
of education. But the book’s aim is not the theoretical determina-
tion of education itself. Rather, Culp is concerned with the ques-
tion of giving education the right normative foundation to solve 
the social, ecological and democratic challenges the globalized 
world is currently facing. I don’t think that one can or should 
discuss and analyse education without normative considerations. 
Educational thinking cannot do without a normative foundation 
and it is helpful and necessary to reflect upon them philosophi-
cally. This is the central concern of the book, and there is nothing 
to be added to it by historians or educational researchers. But 
a purely normative approach runs the risk of repeating many of 
the problems inherent in educational thinking. I think that even 
a normative approach would gain a lot from taking the empirical 
and historical boundaries of its subject more seriously than Culp 
does. Therefore, most of my remarks are about the relationship 
between normative theory and historical realities.
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In the following I would like to expose Julian Culp’s normative argumentation to some 
empirical considerations. I argue from the perspective of a historian of education. So, 
my empirical data are historical phenomena and developments.
My commentary focuses on one of the central premises of the book: Culp assumes 
that education can make a decisive contribution to solving the current challenges in 
plural and globalized societies. He states that recent political philosophy has unaccep-
tably neglected the issue of education.
But the book’s aim is not the theoretical determination of education itself. Rather, 
Culp is concerned with the question of giving education the right normative foundation 
to solve the social, ecological and democratic challenges the globalized world is 
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currently facing. He is convinced that ‘there are several real world problems that can be 
neither properly grasped nor adequately resolved without engaging in the kind of 
political philosophy of education and philosophy of political education’ (p. 182) 
which is discussed in the book. On a more practical note, he concludes, for example, 
that the rise of right-wing populist parties could have been prevented by courageous 
and well-founded transnational citizenship education (p. 186).
The question of the extent to which education is an appropriate means to this end 
remains surprisingly underexposed in the book. In my view, this is due to the norma-
tive approach, which stands in the way of an analytical clarification of what education 
actually is and can be.
I don’t think that one can or should discuss and analyse education without norma-
tive considerations. Educational thinking cannot do without a normative foundation 
and it is helpful and necessary to reflect upon them philosophically. This is the central 
concern of the book, and there is nothing to be added to it by historians or educational 
researchers. But a purely normative approach runs the risk of repeating many of the 
problems inherent in educational thinking. I think that even a normative approach 
would gain a lot from taking the empirical and historical boundaries of its subject more 
seriously than Culp does.
Therefore, most of my remarks are about the relationship between normative theory 
and historical realities.
The two meanings of educational impact
Before I start with some historical reflections, I would first like to make a distinction 
that I consider to be very central when discussing what can be achieved through 
education. They might be called the ‘Adam Smith approach’ and the ‘John Dewey 
approach’. Adam Smith (2002) produced his first major work, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, before becoming the forefather of modern economics. Naturally, the book 
deals not only with social psychology, rather, many of the examples Smith uses touch 
on educational issues. In the book, Smith tries to answer the question of how man, as 
a fundamentally selfish being, is nevertheless capable of something like ‘sympathy’. In 
contrast to his second major work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations, he refers not only to public or private schooling here, but talks about 
educational phenomena in a much more fundamental way.
According to Smith, mercy and compassion are not learned as virtues later in life, 
but are acquired in the original education, when growing up, in the family environ-
ment. We cannot experience the feelings of others ourselves, but we can put ourselves 
in their situation. So we consider what the situation of another person would mean for 
us. This applies to sorrow as well as to joy. Rather incidentally, we also form general 
rules through our observations – we see how others disapprove of certain actions. In 
this way, general rules of morality are formed. These must then only become a habit.
Even the affection found within the family is, from this perspective, the product of 
a habituation process. However, Smith does not trust schools and universities to do 
much in this context. The entire formation of sympathy happens in concentric circles 
around the family and in the immediate natural environment. In other areas of social 
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life, such processes of mutual social stimulation are only conceivable to a limited extent 
and are much more preconditioned.
The counter-programme is represented by John Dewey. With an immensely broad 
concept of education (Dewey 2002), covering a wide spectrum from socialization and 
experience to teaching and group interaction, Dewey wants education to transform 
society. To him in his time, education itself was already becoming the mode in which 
social change was taking place. Dewey was certainly not a member of the technocratic 
faction of progressivism which would be much more successful in the long run (Labaree 
2010b), and he was certainly not one of the ‘illiberal reformers’ that Thomas C. Leonard 
(2016) has studied. But for Dewey and for all his fellow progressives, education has the 
function of initiating and sustaining comprehensive social change. The goal here is 
democracy as an equal ‘social intercourse’, which should already take place in the 
classroom.
My aim here is not to defend Smith’s radical criticism of schools, which historically 
was aimed at a completely different educational system. Nor is it my intention to ask 
whether Smith’s beliefs in the positive impact of families is perhaps a little bit too 
optimistic. Rather, my argument is about the fact that education, in Smith’s view, is not 
first an instrument that can be used for a specific purpose but is nevertheless an 
immensely powerful institution.
Like Smith, Dewey believes in the power of education. However, while Smith in his 
early work on moral philosophy (a discussion of Smith’s educational thought in the 
entire work would have to be somewhat more differentiated) does not assume that 
education should be placed in the service of a higher cause, but is more concerned with 
how to guarantee the rudimentary social routines of a liberal society, Dewey’s educa-
tional program is intended to help create community through constant communicative 
intercourse. I think that, in educational terms, Dewey is more part of the problem than 
part of the solution, and that when it comes to questions of education, it is worth 
trusting, like Smith, in the incidental and unexpected results of educational efforts as 
opposed to making them the centre of social or economic reform.
Culp explicitly places himself in the Dewey camp. From Dewey, he takes the idea 
that the ‘philosophy of education’ is ‘only an explicit formulation of the problems of the 
formation of right mental and moral habitudes in respect to the difficulties of con-
temporary social life’ (Dewey 1980, 341). The current problem that Culp wants to solve 
with a comprehensive normative foundation of education is the global challenge. For 
this purpose, a ‘transnational democratic conscientization’ seems to be needed, 
a ‘formation of global consciousness’ (pp. 109–111).
A historical view on urgent calls for education reforms
Perhaps somewhat inappropriate in a philosophical context, I understand normative 
interventions, how elaborate they may be, as statements by historical actors. I wonder 
what significance normative statements about education had in history and what 
conclusions can be drawn from them for an explicitly normative theory of education.
One of the strengths of Culp’s contribution, in my view, is its clear opposition to 
a functionalist justification of democratic education. Culp states that functionalist 
conceptions ‘merely aim at facilitating the reproduction of the given cultural, economic 
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and political orders, which already have been globalized, rather than attempting to 
change these orders in light of normative ideas about global justice’ (p. 10). He 
questions the ‘assumption that education necessarily stabilizes the existing social 
order’ (p. 27).
Culp admits, of course, that education as a concrete cultural activity can have an 
instrumental character, but he questions whether educational public policy can also be 
legitimized in this way. In a narrower sense, he also questions attempts to legitimize 
educational public policies through the goals of human capital formation or personal 
autonomy. Both approaches, either practically or theoretically dominant, seem to lack 
the necessary scope. It is for this reason that he turns to a specific conception of justice 
from which democratic education can only be justified.
All the varieties of a public educational policy that Culp discusses and criticizes can 
be found in the history of education. Of course, there are straight functionalist 
approaches that want to put schools entirely at the service of a functioning economy 
or technological development (Oliver 2004; Teixeira 20140; Bürgi 2019). But there are 
also functionalist approaches that want to fight poverty by means of education (Silver 
and Silver 1991), to advocate greater sensitivity to questions of social diversity – Amy 
Gutmann (1995) speaks of ‘mutual respect’ – or use education to guarantee a more 
sustainable lifestyle (Kass 2018).
In the history of education, human capital formation and personal autonomy as 
educational goals have often been the starting point for comprehensive educational 
programmes, but also for the development of concrete pedagogical instruments. 
I would argue, however, that there were also approaches which, like Culp, were based 
on a more global conception of democratic education. In particular, actors who worked 
closely with UNESCO preferred such a so-called humanist concept of lifelong education 
until the 1970s and sometimes beyond (Elfert 2016).
‘So what?’ one could ask. I think that these historically existing strategies of justifica-
tion give rise to a series of questions that I would like to put to Julian Culp. First, in the 
history of education, it can be observed that a specific justification does not necessarily 
result in a concrete policy. In fact, diverging justification strategies can lead to the same 
approaches. For example, a functionalist justification that wants to stimulate the labour 
market can coincide with gender or migration policy concerns. In a coalition of 
interests, a joint program of very different camps emerges which justify this agenda 
differently in each case.
Second, the historians David Tyack and Larry Cuban have repeatedly shown how 
progressive educational reforms in the 20th century failed time and again. The catalo-
gue of measures therefore seemed to make sense against the background of the 
justification for the project, but the results were not as expected. In particular, educa-
tional reformers tend to underestimate not only the inertia of the system, Tyack and 
Tobin (1994) speak of a ‘grammar of schooling’, but also the wisdom of practice and the 
importance of functioning routines in school life (Cuban 1984; Tyack and Cuban 1995).
Third, no matter how well-founded public policies may be, they cannot prevent 
education from being perceived as a positional good. David Labaree has repeatedly 
criticized the resulting ‘credentials race’, most clearly in his book Someone Has to 
Fail. Labaree does not justify the fierce cut-throat competition between formally 
equally qualified employees, but rather criticizes the well-meaning education policy 
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that this system has brought forth in the first place. The warning that an expansion 
of higher education would be accompanied by increased competition among gradu-
ates from academia and a devaluation of vocational certificates was usually only 
voiced by conservative commentators who wanted to preserve the hierarchical 
society.
My point is that while education can be justified on the basis of a theory of justice, it 
does not escape the problem that education is one of the most important instruments 
for stabilizing a hierarchical social order. Thus, on an individual level, education serves 
those who are concerned about their own career or the social advancement of their 
children. This can only be broken up to a limited extent in terms of education policy, 
since the next mode is quickly developed within the privileged population, only to then 
set itself apart from the rest.
Normative approaches and empirical considerations
This brings me to my final point. I no longer believe that education is the place to 
discuss questions of social or even global justice. It goes without saying that everything 
should be done to ensure that opportunities to participate in education do not depend 
on residence, property, citizenship or gender. However, the decisive factors for broader 
participation in education are not initially or solely to be found in educational public 
policy.
In comparative research on the history of education, a concept has been intensively 
discussed in recent decades that speaks of an ‘educationalisation of social problems’ 
(Depaepe and Smeyers 2008). What is meant by this is a transformation of social tasks 
into problems that schools have to solve. Thus, with the implementation of compulsory 
schooling, new tasks were delegated to the school time and again, such as gender 
equality, social justice, peace, sustainable management, diversity and so on. But teachers 
are already busy teaching students reading, writing and arithmetic, as well as history, 
geography or science. They work in social conditions, which they may be able to 
counter moderately in their work, but which they cannot overcome.
In view of the rich historical experience with normatively charged educational 
reforms, it seems to me necessary to conclude from the impact that education can 
have, that it cannot simply be steered politically in the desired direction. Instead, 
ponderous structures, necessary routines, parental decisions and numerous contextual 
factors must be taken into account as well. Education is an extremely powerful social 
institution, but its use, at least collectively, is limited. It is also dependent on several 
other factors, which in turn cannot be changed directly through education. There is 
a danger that economic inequality, global injustice, gender discrimination, lack of 
productivity or technological innovation will simply be reinterpreted as an educational 
problem and other more important actions will not be considered. Nor should we 
underestimate the resistance that best intentions can provoke – and what the conse-
quences are. For example, Michelle Nickerson has shown how resistance to the intro-
duction of progressive and cosmopolitan educational programs in the Los Angeles 
region has fostered the emergence of a neo-conservative movement within the 
Republican Party. Only an educational reform aimed at a global perspective was able 
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to mobilize enough people, in Nickerson’s case the conservative housewives, and press 
them into political activism (Nickerson 2012).
Even if I do not fully share the conclusions of Danielle Allen’s essay on education 
and equality, I agree with her that it makes sense, to think more about what education 
can really achieve. Allen is totally right to point out that the many policy proposals lack 
an adequate analytical foundation. However, she does not attempt to provide 
a normative foundation first, but rather develops, with Hannah Arendt, an approach 
to how education itself can be thought of in terms of form and content. Allen rightly 
suggests that first it should be clarified how education relates to the normative program 
for which it is intended to be a solution. She asks, in her case regarding the issue of 
equality, whether there is actually an intrinsic link to education (Allen 2016).
Allen acknowledges that, in addition to the intrinsic link between the issue at stake 
and education, socioeconomic factors must also be considered. I would like to add to 
these traditions, structures, routines and path dependencies. Education has always 
fulfilled a number of functions and is socially embedded in a certain way. This must 
also be considered analytically when it comes to clarifying what role education should 
play in solving social or even global problems. These include the political economy of 
skill formation (Durazzi 2019), the role of education as a positional good (Adnett and 
Davies 2002), and the specific cultural or even national tradition of educational dis-
course (Biesta 2012; Horlacher 2016).
In my view, the central question is not what contribution a normatively founded 
education can make to this or that problem. Rather, it is much more important to 
understand education as a public good whose form and function can be determined 
democratically. Politics then has the task of making offers on how the public good can 
continue to be guaranteed. In her intellectual history of political liberalism, Katrina 
Forrester (2019) has impressively demonstrated how political philosophy has settled 
itself in a normative postwar consensus. The ideal worlds for which Rawls had made 
a congenial analytical offer prevented theory from contributing anything to the pressing 
problems of the time. At a time when deregulation, the rise of the service economy, and 
a fundamental structural change were taking place, political philosophy established 
itself in an ideal world based on full employment, a developed welfare state and 
expansion of education as the normal case which just had to be defended in analytical 
terms.
I cannot even imagine which global institutions should enforce the form of educa-
tion Culp proposes. Of course, the educational organizations related to the UN or other 
supranational and transnational actors could deal more with the problems of a global 
society. I’m just not sure whether awareness education should really be the first priority 
and whether other issues are not much more urgent here; after all, one should not 
overestimate the power of these institutions. Policy continues to take place to a large 
extent within defined territories with mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. The fact 
that this has been recognized as problematic (Nussbaum 2006) does not alter the 
problem that this is a reality in which education policy in particular must be 
implemented.
I would therefore argue less for the implementation of a global form of citizenship 
education and more for taking the struggle for an appropriate alignment of general and 
specific education more seriously again. In this context, the different normative 
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assumptions must be critically examined. Education always transcends the present, 
especially in its anticipated form. But it is also conditioned by the context in which it 
occurs, which must be considered both analytically and normatively. Education is 
embedded in a whole bundle of structural, cultural and political conditions, which in 
my view must be reflected more strongly in a democratic philosophy of education than 
is often the case.
In my view, a transnational or global approach to education reform fails to recognize 
the challenges we are currently facing. The multiple conditionalities of education mean 
that a democratic policy must take local needs into account. A normative theory that 
does not reflect this might miss the actual problem. The struggle for education as 
a public good that allows political and economic participation for all inhabitants of 
a territory happens locally. For poor countries and neglected world regions, however, 
the solution lies not first and foremost in a transnational awareness education, but in 
economic policies that enable these states to provide their population with the educa-
tion and training they need. In a first step, the problem of global educational justice is 
therefore not an educational one. If these are ensured, the question that arises in rich 
and poor countries alike is this: How can we ensure that education remains a public 
good? And how can such a policy of public education be normatively justified under 
today’s conditions? My plea for the next book thus goes in the direction of paying 
greater attention to these historical or empirical conditionalities. I think that at least 
most of us agree that education should not be founded on functionalism alone, and that 
questions of justice must be taken into account in this context. However, historical 
research has shown more than once that it seems unlikely that persistent and long- 
lasting educational mechanisms, which are also closely linked to structures outside the 
school system, can be challenged by good arguments. It is rather the contexts that need 
to be changed first.
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